Reshaping Regional Institutions: APEC and the IMF in East Asia by Beeson, Mark
 1
 
Reshaping regional institutions:  




The economic and latterly political crises that continue to grip East Asia raise important 
questions about both the way such events are best managed and about the way they 
should be understood. Although attention has thus far understandably focused primarily 
on the possible causes of the crisis or the sorts of policies that might alleviate its  most 
immediate effects, it is also forcing a re-evaluation of a number of key theoretical issues 
which are central to conceptions of the region and its future  evolution. Given that one 
of the key determinants of any possible future regional  developmental trajectory will be 
the institutional infrastructure  that emerges in the wake of the crisis, it is timely to 
consider the theory of institutions as well as their possible construction in the wake of 
the crisis. 
 
The shaping of the region’s institutional architecture has, in fact, become a major  issue 
and object of political contestation in attempts to resolve the crisis. Consequently, the 
crisis has had the effect of sharply revealing  differences in approach between two  key 
inter-governmental agencies – the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – in their respective approaches to crisis 
management in particular and institutional development more generally. Before the 
crisis struck it might reasonably have been expected that APEC, rather than the IMF, 
would have played the most prominent role in trying to manage the crisis. After all, 
APEC is the only organisation that includes all the key players involved in the unfolding 
crisis, and is concerned principally with issues of economic management. And yet 
APEC has been conspicuous by its absence, the IMF having assumed the dominant role 
in both the attempted management of the crisis and – more importantly in the longer-
term – in fundamentally re-shaping the region’s economic and political  institutions.  
 
The very distinctive roles played by APEC and the IMF reveal much about both the 
different logics, assumptions and expectations that inform these organisations and their 
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approach to institutional reform. A consideration of the different approaches taken  by 
APEC and the IMF to the crisis also casts a revealing light on different theoretical 
understandings of institutions and their evolution. Although it is not being suggested 
here that there is a direct causal relationship between a particular theoretical position 
and subsequent policy, a reconsideration of institutional theory in light of the crisis can 
tell us much about the usefulness of particular theories in themselves, and help us to 
understand both the course of the current crisis and its possible future evolution. In what 
follows, therefore, I initially undertake a survey of the more useful and/or influential 
variants of institutional theory, before considering the role of APEC and the IMF, and 





For all their prominence in theoretical debates and everyday life, there are remarkably 
varied views about what  institutions actually are. Depending on the definition, 
phenomena as varied as marriage, the monarchy or Manchester United can be 
considered as such. Plainly, this is a signifier of some flexibility. Indeed, so elastic a 
notion may be considered too imprecise to aid our understanding of complex patterns of 
social activity. Yet it is possible to gain a more precise idea of what institutions may be 
by considering the notion’s utilisation within discrete disciplines. This is not only a 
revealing exercise in itself, but it also illuminates the way in which specific conceptions 
of institutions have come to influence patterns of economic and social organisation. 
While there may be no simple correlation between the theoretical models that dominate 
academic discourse and the sorts of policies implemented by national political elites, 
neither are they unrelated: clearly they reflect and help construct the ontological reality 
policy-makers inhabit.  
 
One of the more influential theorists of institutions, Robert Keohane, has suggested that 
particular conceptions of, or ideas about,  social or political orders act as ‘road maps’,  
influencing the construction of policy and ultimately becoming embedded in political 
institutions (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 3). This is a persuasive notion: clearly, policy 
makers develop policy based on a particular, socially constructed understanding of the 
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‘reality’ they inhabit (Berger and Luckmann 1971).  I shall consider Keohane’s position 
more fully below, but there is an important implication to be drawn from his contention 
about the importance of ideas that is of particular relevance here. If our understanding of 
political and economic ‘reality’ is essentially ideational, this means that, as Wendt 
(1992: 399) points out,  institutions themselves are ‘fundamentally cognitive entities 
that do not exist apart from actors’ ideas about how the world works’.  In other words, 
the form institutions ultimately take is not determined exogenously, but bound up with 
the beliefs, values and intellectual traditions of the participants.  
 
This has been an especially important consideration in APEC’s case. The way 
institutions are conceived amongst APEC’s non-Asian members in particular reflects 
the ideational dominance of a distinctively Anglo-American intellectual tradition that 
makes important ontological assumptions, not the least of which being  about the 
potential for ‘rational’ goal-oriented  action and the benefits of cooperation. Although 
the  IMF shares many  of the goals that are central to APEC’s reform agenda, in contrast 
to APEC it has displayed a willingness to use direct political and economic leverage to 
achieve its aims, of which re-shaping a number of national institutions throughout the 
region is amongst the most central. At the very least, this reveals interesting differences 
in thinking within these organisations about the most efficacious ways of achieving 
institutional change. In order to draw out these differences and the assumptions that 
inform them, I shall review the some of the more important contributions to institutional 
theory. Such an analysis is timely, both as a test of the continuing utility of various 
theoretical positions in light of the crisis, and because they may have much to tell us 
about future institutional development in the region. To facilitate this discussion and 
explicate the manner in which  institutions have been theorised, it is helpful to 
discriminate between disciplinary traditions in economics and political science, 




Institutions in economic theory 
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It needs to be acknowledged at the outset that attempting to demarcate between 
economics and politics at the level of theory, let alone in brute material reality, is an 
inherently artificial exercise. Nevertheless, it is possible to distinguish distinctive 
schools of thought in which institutions loom large. Even within those strands of  
institutional theorisation that are  most closely identified with economics, however,  it is 
possible to distinguish sub-groups and chronological ruptures. The ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
forms of institutional economics are characterised by very different methodologies and 
foci. The old institutional theory, of which Thorstein Veblen and John Commons are, 
perhaps, the most celebrated proponents, was descriptive, holistic, collectivist by 
orientation and against formalism. The new economic institutionalism, on the other 
hand, is invariably  formalist, individualist, reductionist, ‘orientated toward rational 
choice and economising models, and generally anti-interventionist’ (Rutherford 1994: 
4). 
 
There is an important methodological shift between the old and new institutionalisms, 
which has had a significant influence on both theory and practice. At a theoretical level, 
Cammack (1992: 403) suggests that it is possible to identify a strand of institutionalist 
thought  predicated upon methodological individualism, an orientation that reflects an 
inherent  functionalism and which finds expression in rational choice theory. In this 
formulation, in other words, institutions are considered to move toward greater degrees 
of ‘efficiency’ in response to the rationally expressed ‘needs’ of utility maximising and 
calculating individuals.  The second discrete perspective Cammack identifies - a 
sociological or historical-structural version of institutionalism - has generally been more 
closely associated with political science. What is important to note here, however,  is 
that the individualistic, rational choice variety of institutionalist thought, which draws 
much of its theoretical inspiration from neoclassical economics, has exerted a profound 
influence on  the political science discipline itself and ultimately, as we shall see, on 
political practice (Leys 1996: 38).  
 
In some variants of the new institutionalism, economic practices are isolated from 
politics, and attention is focused on specific institutional forms like firms or markets. 
For theorists like Oliver Williamson (1985: 17), for example, institutional development 
is to be understood as a function of the desire to reduce ‘transaction costs’. In other 
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words, institutions’ principal rationale is economic, and they will inevitably  evolve 
toward increasingly ‘efficient’ and complex forms of organisation if they are allowed to 
do so. Moreover, Williamson (1993: 121) contends that transaction cost economics  is 
an approach that is universally valid, and can explain the developmental trajectories  of 
the Anglo-Americans economies and those of  East Asia. However, the  concept of 
‘path dependency’ - one of institutional economics’ most useful contributions - suggests 
that this universality may be more apparent than actual. The idea of path dependency  
emphasises that new institutions emerge from, or changes occur to existent institutions, 
within established patterns of institutional organisation. 
 
Douglass North has been one of the most important and interesting of the new 
institutionalists. North has provided something of a bridge between an institutionalism 
based on  rational choice theory, like Williamson’s (and, as we shall see, Keohane’s), 
and an historical institutionalism that takes contingent historical circumstance 
seriously.1 For North (1994: 359), institutions ‘form from the incentive structure of a 
society, and the political and economic institutions, in consequence, are the underlying 
determinants of economic performance’. Although North (1990a: 5) stresses that 
institutions vary across time and space and influence subsequent patterns of 
development, his analysis seeks to build upon, rather than replace, the  ‘choice theoretic 
approach of neoclassical economic theory’. Institutions, then, are the ‘rules of the 
game’, or ‘the humanly devised  constraints that structure human interaction’ (North 
1995: 23). Despite North’s determination to continue working within the neoclassical 
paradigm, his work represents an important and influential recognition of the influence 
of historical contingency, and the possibility that institutional development will not 
necessarily reflect narrowly conceived (Anglo-American) definitions of economic 
efficiency on the one hand, nor inevitably converge on functionally optimal end-points 
on the other.  
 
Several points emerge from this discussion of North’s work and are worth emphasising. 
First, in North’s formulation institutional (and national) development is path dependent. 
Depending how such institutions are defined, this may include not simply economic 
organisations, but political and even cultural constellations.2 Second, the quest for 
increasing economic efficiency may not be the principal, or even a significant 
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determinant of institutional form or development.3 Such considerations introduce an 
altogether more complex conception of institutions and their potential impact on the 
course of economic and political development. Indeed, a theoretical model of 
institutions which considers not just economic phenomena  like firms and markets, but 
which also includes other more explicitly social factors like political parties or even  
trade unions, suggests that the implicit  teleological assumptions of institutional 
‘convergence’ are at best premature and at worst, highly ethnocentric (Beeson 1996). 
The assumption that economic development would inevitably  generate specific forms 
of social or political development was, therefore,  always questionable, but in the wake 
of the crisis and the profound dislocation it has caused, it looks even more unlikely. 
Indeed, it should be emphasised that the crisis has caused a deterioration in the  strategic 
environment which has exacerbated tensions both within the region, and between East 
Asia and the US, which is widely seen as the guiding hand behind the IMF’s painful 
reform measures (Higgott 1998; Dibb et al 1998) 
 
These issues will be considered in more detail below, but it is worth emphasising here 
that the dramatic changes within the region may have actually made APEC-style reform 
more, rather than less difficult. When institutions are considered as the products of 
specific trajectories of national development, rather than as universal and neutral 
reflections of increasing economic efficiency,  it becomes apparent that there are both 
substantial variations in national institutional forms, and potential obstacles to 
convergence (Zysman 1994). Where such formations are deeply embedded in and 
supported by national social and political structures  they are neither likely to be easily 
changed nor seamlessly integrated into transnational organisations. It is precisely this 
possibility - and the limitations of  APEC-led reform - that appears to have informed the 
IMF approach and accounted for its prominence in the management of the current crisis. 
To gain a clearer understanding of the different approaches taken to institutional 
development by APEC and the IMF, it is helpful to consider the distinctive contribution 
to institutional theory in the political science literature. 
 
 
Institutions in political science 
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At the heart of  March and Olsen’s (1984) influential conception of the new 
institutionalism was an insistence that political institutions had assumed a ‘more 
autonomous’ role which needed to be theoretically acknowledged. In their formulation, 
institutions became ‘political actors’ in their own right, having the power to 
independently ‘affect the flow of history’. In other words, once created, institutions took  
on a life of their own, influencing and shaping their environment in unpredictable ways; 
ways  that may not have been intended by their original sponsors. The end of  the Cold 
War combined with the decline of both  super-power rivalry and the dominant position 
of the superpowers themselves, has led to  increased attention being paid to the role of 
international institutions and the possibility of enhanced trans-national cooperation. As 
Keohane (1984: 246) put it fifteen years ago, ‘when we think about cooperation after 
hegemony, we need to think about institutions’. 
 
Yet even if the increased importance of international cooperation and institution 
building is accepted, what is noteworthy about some of the  influential perspectives 
emerging from North America in particular has been the restricted depiction of what 
institutions actually entail. At one level this has been manifest in the ‘remarkable’ 
neglect of the domestic bases of national foreign policies (Milner 1992: 481). The 
theoretical parsimony of systemic theory is achieved at the cost of reducing national 
domestic politics to little more than a cipher, something that causes differences in 
national forms of social and economic organisation to be understated and neglected. But 
this is a reflection of a more fundamental commitment to a methodology that is 
inherently teleological and which draws much of its theoretical inspiration from the 
same principles as the more overtly economic institutionalists, like Williamson. 
International institutions in this view are mechanisms through which rational 
governments may cooperate to reduce transaction costs and thus further their own self-
interests (Keohane 1984). There is little recognition that the concept of rationality may 
be highly contingent,4 or that the interests which national governments pursue may be 
fundamentally antagonistic or incommensurate. 
 
Keohane’s (1989: 166)  influential view of international institution building is 
predicated upon the assumption that there are ‘considerable benefits to be secured from 
international agreement’. Superficially, this may seem an uncontroversial observation. 
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Surely, nations would not cooperate unless there was some tangible benefit to be 
derived from doing so? Yet it is important to recognise that some nations will inevitably 
derive more from international agreements than others, while some may have little 
option than other to cooperate with more powerful nations, even where there appears to 
be  little immediate benefit from doing so. While APEC, as we shall see, may indeed be 
predicated upon a rationale that assumes mutual benefits from cooperation, the approach  
of the IMF  suggests that there is also a widespread  perception that an international 
political and economic environment currently exists that allows powerful actors to try 
and impose a particular order on East Asia with comparatively little cost or resistance.  
 
The methodology and language of rational choice theory and the new institutionalism 
appealed to both political scientists in search of theoretical parsimony and ‘scientific’ 
rigour, and  to policymakers in search of a coherent formulae with which to promote 
economic and even social development. When such abstractions were translated into 
specific ‘structural adjustment’  policies by influential organisations like the World 
Bank, the implicit liberal predicates of such policies had a direct impact on local 
political structures and social formations (Williams and Young 1994). In other words, 
although the World Bank approach was predicated upon a view of institution building 
that was essentially positive and in the supposed long-term self-interest of its clients, it 
has been able – like the IMF - to reinforce its normative reform agenda with direct 
economic leverage.  Interestingly, however, the World Bank has, particularly in the 
wake of massive, crisis-induced social dislocation throughout Southeast Asia, adopted a 
less doctrinaire approach to economic reconstruction (Berger and Beeson 1998), 
highlighting the rift that has emerged between it and the IMF and about the best method 
of resolving the crisis. 
 
Such differences of opinion suggest that the ascendancy  of the Anglo-American 
reformist paradigm is not grounded in superior technique or problem solving capacity. 
On the contrary, the influence of market-oriented reform policies  owes a good deal to 
the sorts of overt economic leverage available to powerful transnational organisations in 
enforcing a specific set of economic practices and ideational norms ( Gill 1993). It is 
essentially a political project, increasingly informed by the theoretical precepts of 
neoclassical economics in general and the transaction cost economics in particular. 
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Central to the prescriptive injunctions of these Anglo-American oriented agencies is an 
implicitly teleological view of economic development, in which the institutions that 
govern and shape economic activity become progressively more efficient.  
 
And yet for all the direct economic and political reformist pressure that the nations of 
East Asia are currently experiencing, it is not at all clear that the economies of East Asia 
will ‘converge’ on the Anglo-American model. The distinctive patterns of political and 
economic organisation that have emerged throughout East Asia have developed through 
a process of historical accretion, and are likely to prove resistant to the sorts of 
teleological rationality implicit  in much institutional literature. There is, however, a 
branch of institutional theory which not only takes historical processes seriously, but 
which provides a way of comprehending  the different institutional forms that result. 
The next section considers both this theoretical perspective and the sorts of historically 
specific analyses it has generated.  
 
 
Historical institutionalism and the persistence of  difference 
 
 ‘Historical’ institutionalists adopt a  more comprehensive  formulation than those 
considered hitherto. Institutions are taken to be more complex  entities, embracing ‘the 
formal and informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the 
organisational structure of the polity or  political economy’ (Hall and Taylor 1996: 938). 
In this wider conception, institutions are not theoretically  limited to discrete 
phenomenon like firms, for example,  but expanded  to capture the influence of the 
broader historical and social milieu from which they emerge. A consideration of the 
national context within which institutions are embedded, with all the historical 
specificity that implies, provides a more persuasive  account of the persistent differences 
that continue to characterise notionally similar institutions across nations. It is precisely 
this sort of analysis that is missing in many of the more narrowly defined readings of 
institutions that inform not just influential and predominantly north American brands of 
theorisation, but also provides the underpinning logic for  APEC’s approach to 
institutional reform.  
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Rather than the rational pursuit of  economic outcomes, an historical institutional 
analysis suggests that economic policy is necessarily political and the outcome of 
enduring processes. One of Peter  Hall’s (1986: 19-21)  most important and persuasive 
contentions is that the different economic policies pursued by individual nations are not 
simply determined by prevailing economic conditions, but are shaped by contingent  
political and organisational dynamics. The particular accommodations reached between 
capital, labour and national governments  not only display a good deal of variation 
across nations, but such variations are ultimately  institutionalised in distinctive patterns 
of authority relations, rules, and social practices that distinguish one polity from 
another. Moreover, contemporary relationships between economic and political actors 
are affected by the institutional memory of previous accommodations. In other words, 
political relations and economic structures are not infinitely malleable and capable of 
easily responding rationally to shifting patterns of  incentives, but path dependent 
structures reflective of existent and historically entrenched social relations. 
 
The importance of such theoretical considerations is especially apparent in East Asia. 
An historically informed brand of institutionalism is particularly  relevant at a number 
of interconnected levels of analysis. First, the developmental trajectories and national 
accommodations reached within the Asian part of the ‘Asia-Pacific region’ have been 
shaped by the larger international context of which they are a part. As Stubbs (1994) 
points out, the US’s strategic interests during the Cold War provided a crucial spur to 
East Asia’s economic development. Aid and military spending provided an important 
stimulus for economic expansion, whilst simultaneously consolidating and legitimising 
state structures and  the specific institutionalised patterns they assumed. The  US’s 
strategic dominance of East Asia  and its unilateral approach  meant  that ‘the capitalist 
countries of the region tended to communicate with one another through the United 
States’ (Cumings 1997: 155 [emphasis in original]). Consequently, there is little 
tradition of multilateral relations for a new organisation like APEC to build on.  
 
Recognition of the enduring and distinctive patterns of national institutional 
consolidation is especially important in an East Asian region which was, until recently 
at least, synonymous with the ‘developmental state’ (Johnson  1982).  While Japan’s 
current economic problems and the crisis more generally have raised  long-term 
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questions about the viability of the Northeast Asian interventionist model (Beeson 
forthcoming a), it is important to remember quite how widespread the developmental, 
dirigiste model became throughout the region (Wade 1990; Castells 1992).  Not only 
did states adopt policies at odds with the minimalist, non-interventionist, market-
oriented ideal posited in Anglo-American economic orthodoxy and embodied in 
APEC’s reform agenda, but this alternative state-led developmental model  became 
structurally embedded in institutionalised distributional coalitions throughout the 
region. It was the recognition of precisely this sort of  potential  obstruction to 
neoliberal reform that has, by contrast, made the IMF’s reforms so detailed, specific and 
binding in countries like Indonesia (Robison and Rosser 1998). 
 
An even more obdurate impediment to neoliberal reform and the emergence of 
ubiquitous economic practices and structures is evident at the level of the firm or 
business organisation. Once again, Japan has played a particularly important role in 
defining a type of capitalist organisation that has predominated in  East Asia, both as an 
exemplar and increasingly as the centre of region-wide networks of production and 
distribution. Japan is especially significant here as not only does it have a highly 
distinctive corporate structure embodied in the keiretsu networks of inter-connected 
companies (Gerlach 1992), but it has systematically exported this structure across the 
East Asian region as Japanese corporations have responded to international competitive 
pressures and opportunities and moved off-shore (Hatch and Yamamura 1996). As 
elements of these distinctive forms of corporate organisation have been exported, they 
have integrated neighbouring economies into hierarchically organised production 
structures with their apex in Japan. Moreover, these evolving regional production 
networks have been systematically institutionalised and entrenched by a complex array 
of political connections, economic assistance packages and trade agreements that have 
made their modification by market-oriented policy initiatives inherently problematic. 
Rather than benefiting from and responding to the sorts of enhanced market signals that 
an APEC-led liberalised trading environment might provide, Japanese companies have 
developed ‘glocalisation’ strategies that actually take advantage of  market ‘distortions’ 
and host government incentives (Ruigrok and van Tulder 1995: 192). 
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Another distinctive element of East Asian political-economy  that merits brief mention 
as an example of historically embedded institutions that may well prove equally 
impervious to rapid or wholesale change are the business practices associated with the 
so-called ‘overseas Chinese’.  Particularly important in this regard are the political 
connections established between large-scale Chinese capitalists and political elites in a 
number of countries like Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia (Beeson forthcoming b). 
The point to make here is that, despite the traumas being experienced by ethnic Chinese 
communities in Indonesia,  relationship-based (gaunxi) business practices are not only 
unlikely to disappear, but are likely to provide an enduring obstacle to the achievement 
of ‘transparent’ economic relations of the sort being encouraged by APEC and imposed 
by the IMF. 
 
There are, then,  a range of deep-seated patterns of institutionalised organisation in East 
Asia, at the level of the inter-state system, the nation and the firm, which have shaped 
national accommodations and which may prove resistant to rapid modification. To 
understand the potential significance of these structural resistances it is important to 
look more closely at the different approaches taken by the key inter-governmental 
organisations intent on achieving institutional reform in the region. In what follows, I 
shall focus mainly on APEC, as it is a revealing embodiment of influential ideas from 
North American economics and political science, ideas which appear to have been of 
little theoretical or pragmatic utility in the current crisis. 
 
 
The Competing Approaches to Reform of APEC and the IMF 
 
Having considered some of the more influential theories of institutions, I shall now 
examine the different approaches of APEC and the IMF to actually reforming or re-
shaping institutions throughout East Asia in particular. Again, let me emphasise that it is 
not being suggested that there is a direct causal relationship between theory and 
practice. What we can say, however,  is that certain ideas have provided an influential 
backdrop for certain policy initiatives – especially in the case of APEC – and that, at the 
very least, reviewing the experiences of these important organisations a useful way of 




APEC’s institutional evolution 
 
The story of APEC’s origins and consolidation helps illuminate some of the tensions 
and contradictions that threaten to undermine the unproblematic developmental 
trajectories implicit in much institutional theorisation. Two factors are especially 
germane in this regard: the disparate purposes that originally underpinned  individual 
nation’s support for APEC, and the way in which such divergent national purposes and 
perspectives have coalesced into sharply differentiated views about APEC’s present 
role, its future, and its place in the region. Although neoliberal reform of the sort 
championed by APEC has never before been as prominent in the region, it should be re-
emphasised at the outset that this is being imposed upon an East Asian region with little 
history of or enthusiasm for such reforms. APEC’s near invisibility during the crisis 
suggests that its preferred mode of voluntarism and consensually determined, 
cooperatively achieved policy outcomes is incapable of achieving similar results. 
 
Yet the desire to systematically promote some form of  regional cooperation in the 
‘Asia-Pacific’ - at least at the non-governmental level - is at least eighty years old 
(Woods 1993: 33).  Despite the long-standing nature of this ambition, APEC’s 
comparatively recent inauguration has led some observers to conclude that a new and 
compelling nexus currently exists between changing economic circumstances and the 
development of a  concomitant political momentum toward regional institution building 
(Drysdale 1988). Indeed, this sort of analysis often betrays a distinctly functionalist 
tenor, depicting the emergence of APEC as a response to a ‘fundamental need’ in the 
region  for a ‘structure of certainty’ (Dobson & Lee 1994: 231). It is a view that is in 
sympathy with and draws theoretical support from certain forms of institutional theory, 
and given explicit articulation  by influential supporters in terms of  transaction cost 
logic (Elek 1995).  
 
A couple of initial caveats about these sorts of seamless visions are in order, however. 
First, although it is commonplace to refer to an ‘Asia-Pacific region’, it needs to  be 
remembered that the ‘region’ which APEC seeks to integrate politically and 
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economically  is essentially a discursive construction of relatively recent origin (Dirlik 
1992). This is not simply a semantic point; one of APEC’s enduring problems has been 
deciding quite who is eligible for membership. Second, APEC’s highly disparate 
membership contains not only  a wide range of  political and economic formations,5 but 
also potentially incommensurate views about the purpose and character of the 
organisation itself. Indeed, the potential limitations of the APEC approach – especially 
as far as the US was concerned -  and its relative insignificance as a mechanism for 
achieving fundamental economic reform in East Asia was revealed by the decision to 
accept  Russia as a new member. Clearly, the US was prepared to sacrifice APEC’s 
coherence and identity in pursuit of its own wider strategic interests, which continue to 
centre on Europe rather than the Asia Pacific (Kelly 1997). 
 
While the US may be the most important and dramatic illustration of a clash between 
domestic priorities and commitment to the sorts of international cooperative activities 
that influential strands of institutional theory  suggest are becoming more common, it is 
hardly unique. Indeed, it is important to recognise that even for the original sponsors of 
APEC – Australia and Japan – there was a finely grained perception of a national 
interest, the pursuit of which might be most effectively realised through transnational 
mechanisms. The story of the development of economic cooperation in the Asia Pacific 
in general and of APEC’s evolution in particular are by now well enough known to 
require little repetition here (Soesastro 1994; Funabashi 1995).  What does merit 
emphasis is that Japan’s initial proposal for a Pacific free trade area was both driven and 
frustrated by a predominantly political calculus of national self-interest,  rather than 
some universal pursuit of economic rationality (Kerhonen 1994).   
 
Rather than being the result of the rational pursuit of increasingly efficient  institutional 
mechanisms with which to govern economic activity, Yoichi Funabashi (1995: 105) 
contends that  Japan’s (and Australia’s, for that matter) principal motivation in 
promoting APEC in the late 1980s was ‘fear’. Concern about possible American 
isolationism, protectionism and the breakdown of the global trading system into 
competing economic blocs provided powerful incentives for supporting  a regional trade 
grouping that was not only centred on the Pacific, but which had the crucially important 
participation of the US.6 In this regard, Japan’s relationship with the US  is just the most 
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important exemplar of  a region wide imperative: maintaining access to a critically 
important market without which East Asia’s rapid economic development would not 
only have been more difficult in the past, but which might be less assured in the future 
(Bello and Rosenfeld 1990). 
 
Similarly in Australia, although policy was influenced by a coterie of economic advisers 
who subscribed to the predominantly Anglo-American, market-oriented orthodoxy, the 
strategic and economic reorientation toward Asia owed a good deal to changing 
political circumstance. A diminished commitment toward multilateral principles, 
especially on the part of important allies like the US, made the need to establish 
‘insider’ status in some form of regional trade grouping all the more urgent. In short, as 
Australia’s trade and investment became increasingly focused on East Asia, the region  
assumed an importance that made Australia’s possible exclusion unthinkable. 
 
Both APEC’s institutional form and the content of its economic reform agenda reflect 
the interests and influence of its disparate membership. While there may be nothing 
remarkable about such an observation, it merits repeating as it at odds with the 
assumptions of universal political and economic rationality that distinguish mainstream 
institutional theory. One of the more important initial (and continuing) obstacles to 
APEC’s formal  institutionalisation was a concern, especially on the part of the 
countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), that APEC as an 
institution should remain of limited size, influence and scope (Ariff 1994). There was, 
and is, considerable nervousness on the part of some members that APEC may 
institutionalise not just  binding rules and regulations to govern regional commerce, but  
entrench the asymmetries of power that characterise its diverse membership. 
 
Within APEC’s membership, therefore, there are major differences of opinion regarding 
the way the organisation should develop and the range of issues over which it might 
claim authority. These views are informed by and reflective of the different political and 
economic formations, which are themselves the product of enduring historical processes 
(Beeson and Jayasuriya 1998). These differences are not captured in analyses that rely 
on highly abstract formulations that neglect national individuation and historical 
specificity. Even at the most broad brush level there are clearly important and enduring 
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differences in the way political and economic systems are organised amongst APEC’s  
Anglo-American members as opposed to their counterparts in East Asia. APEC’s future 
evolution will therefore be determined by the way such divergent practices are 
accommodated and negotiated.  
 
 
APEC and institutional reform 
 
The policy agendas of both APEC and the IMF are closely aligned with so-called 
‘Washington Consensus’ of fiscal discipline, privatisation, financial and trade 
liberalisation, openness to investment, deregulation and a general concern with 
increasing the ‘transparency’ of economic and political processes (Williamson 1994). 
What distinguishes them, of course, is the way they set about achieving it. Central to 
both these organisations’ essentially neoliberal reform agendas, however, is the desire to 
reshape regional institutions so that they more closely reflect market principles and 
allow such mechanisms to work optimally. Again, APEC’s pre-crisis strategy for 
achieving this goal reflects a range of theoretical influences that now seem somewhat 
anachronistic, and which are, in any case, increasingly at odds with the approach taken 
by the IMF. 
 
The Eminent Persons Group (EPG), created at APEC’s fourth ministerial meeting in 
1992, was charged with developing  a vision for Asia-Pacific trade relations to the year 
2000. Despite the generally ‘pro-business’ orientation of the EPG,7 it has  found it 
difficult to accommodate easily the differing interests and positions of member 
countries, something that has been reflected in much APEC-related discourse.  The 
notion of  ‘open-regionalism’ – or a non-binding commitment to non-discriminatory 
trade liberalisation -  is a good example of the sort of  compromise  the competing 
forces within APEC necessitates.  On the one hand this notion is indicative of the 
influence of key academic economists concerned to reduce transaction costs through the 
removal of trade barriers (see Drysdale and Garnaut 1993), yet at the same time the 
notion  is sufficiently imprecise, open-ended and non-binding as to pose little real threat 
to vested interests or existing patterns of political and economic organisation in the 
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region. Only by adopting such ambiguous language was it possible to accommodate the 
disparate positions amongst APEC’s members.  
 
The EPG (1994: 30) report was forced to advocate seemingly contradictory positions on 
trade deregulation, simultaneously advocating both unilateral and reciprocal 
liberalisation. This latter concession reflects the influence of the US and its desire to use 
APEC as a mechanism to both prize open Asian markets and to put pressure on other 
trade groupings like the European Union to lower trade barriers - the  US only became 
enthusiastic about APEC because of  its potential as a bargaining chip against the (then)  
European Community in the final stages of the Uruguay Round (Ravenhill 1995: 194).  
From the outset, in fact, the US has had a very different approach to APEC than many 
of its other members. 
 
Fred Bergsten (1994), the US representative in the EPG, sees APEC as principally a 
mechanism for  ‘ratcheting up trade liberalisation’,  something  that might, if successful,  
be expected to overcome the US’s chronic and increasing trade deficit with APEC’s 
Asian members by prizing open what generally remain highly protected markets.8 The 
approach of the US in general and Bergsten in particular is one that reflects wider 
American  norms and practices, and finds expression in the promotion of rule-based 
agreements which reduce the possibility of what Bergsten describes as  a ‘continued 
resort to unilateral measures’ (Ito 1995). The desire to lock APEC members into a 
legalistic framework that would establish binding regulations for the conduct of trade, 
and deadlines by which such agreements must be implemented, is clearly something  
that alarms  many of APEC’s Asian members (Garran 1995). It as an approach that it is 
at odds with  the consensus-based, ‘Asian way’ that has characterised organisations like 
ASEAN.  More fundamentally, the US-led legalistic approach fails to recognise that the 
legal system in East Asia is utilised  not so much to restrain the state but, as Jayasuriya 
(1996) observes, deployed as an important instrument of state rule. In other words, the 
assumptions of political rationality and the separation of powers that underpin 




There are other issues apart from possibly incompatible legal and political traditions, 
that made East Asia reluctant to embrace neoliberal reform before the crisis, and which  
may shape future policy developments in the region. The most prominent opponent of 
Anglo-American style reforms both before and since the crisis has been Malaysian 
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad.  Mahathir’s concerns are centred on  the fear that 
‘the South’ may continue to be economically dominated by ‘the North’ (Stewart 1996). 
While the language may be reminiscent of the dependency theorists of the 1960s, it 
reflects a continuing uneasiness about both the impact of unbridled neoliberal reform 
and the potential  that rule-based economic governance has for undermining 
institutionalised distributional coalitions throughout the region. Much of this antipathy 
to neoliberal reform and the imposition of more transparent economic and political 
practices can be explained by recognising that the Malaysian political-economy bears 
little resemblance to the idealised picture depicted in much institutional theory with its 
conceptual differentiation between the state and business. On the contrary, the state, or 
more particularly the ruling United  Malays’ National Organisation (UMNO) which 
dominates Malaysia’s political system, is deeply involved in business activity in 
Malaysia (Gomez 1995).  
 
Malaysia is representative of a number of  long standing vested interests across the 
region that might be seriously damaged by the sorts of transparent commercial practices 
and deregulated economic activities that APEC’s reform agenda proposes.9 There is 
little  to suggest that the sorts of incentive structures mooted in rational choice based 
institutional theory will have much applicability in nations where the distinction 
between political and economic spheres is blurred,  and where the response to the 
apparently universal imperatives of international economic restructuring has until 
recently been mediated largely within the confines of the state (Jayasuriya 1995). More 
fundamentally, it is not impossible that the sorts of issues that Mahathir identifies will 
gain a wider audience in the region if the crisis drags on and orthodox prescriptions fail 
to work. After all, while Mahathir may be primarily concerned with political survival, 
he does identify enduring about the sovereignty of states and the right to pursue 
autonomous, state-led  economic development in the way that all of the early 
industrialising nations did (Landes 1998: 265-6). In other words, resistance to the APEC 
agenda was not predicted exclusively on maintaining a ‘crony capitalist’ status quo – 
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although that may  be important – but on more enduring questions about the validity of 
state-centred economic developmentalism. 
 
It is precisely the embedded and institutionalised relationships, and the economic and 
political practices that are associated with them,  that are inherent to the East Asian 
developmental states and which the IMF has sought to target in its attempts to impose 
neoliberalism throughout the region. 
 
 
The IMF’s approach to institutional reform 
 
If APEC’s attempts to promote market-centred neoliberal reform have been centred on 
moral suasion and voluntarism, the IMF’s has approach has been altogether more 
forceful and coercive. While both organisations may share the view that the 
development of appropriate economic policy is ultimately a ‘technical’ matter, the IMF 
has been presented with a possibly unique historical opportunity to systematically 
impose its preferred policy vision upon a number of countries with little power to resist. 
In order to understand why the IMF finds itself in such a uniquely powerful position in 
the region, and why it is attempting to impose specific sorts of reforms, it is helpful to 
sketch briefly its own institutional evolution and place in the international system. 
 
Although the story of the emergence of the Bretton Woods system – of which the IMF 
was a key element – is well enough known to need little repetition here, it is worth 
stressing just how remarkable a change has occurred not only to the overall Bretton 
Woods system itself, but also in the role of bodies like the IMF.10  The rationale that 
underpinned what Ruggie (1982) famously described as the compromise of embedded 
liberalism, in which countries retained a degree of domestic policy autonomy within an 
open international economic system, has been overturned as the barriers between the 
national and international spheres have become increasingly porous.  
 
The IMF’s own evolution has mirrored this wider systemic change. From being an 
institution charged with maintaining equilibrium within an essentially regulated 
international system in which fixed exchange rates and regulated financial sectors were 
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central components, the IMF has now become the principle instrument for eliminating 
such restrictions and imposing an open, liberalised economic order with fewer 
restrictions on the movement of capital. Significantly, when the IMF was reconstituted 
in the 1970s to accommodate an increasingly liberalised international financial system, 
states ‘formalised their commitment to the principle of multilateral oversight’ (Pauly 
1997: 38). It is precisely this surveillance capacity, critics contend, that is associated 
with the imposition of a form of ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’ (Gill 1997), something 
which effectively de-legitimises East Asian styles of economic development. Indeed, it 
should be emphasised that whereas the architects of the original post-war Bretton 
Woods order saw unrestrained market forces as potentially dangerous, destructive and 
intimately associated with the Depression, market forces are now  viewed by the IMF as 
having the capacity to  ‘exert a disciplining influence on countries’ macroeconomic 
policies’ (Fischer 1997: 3). 
 
The idea that financial liberalisation might be an instrument of disciplinary power, 
rather than the rationally chosen solution to a specific economic problem, is revealing 
enough in itself. However, it is the IMF’s close alignment with the US and its foreign 
policy goals that has raised important questions about the IMF’s ‘rescue’ packages in 
particular and about the general course of inter-regional relations more generally. 
Indeed, the IMF’s own institutional evolution, structure and relations with the US 
suggest that the consolidation of a market-centred economic order in the Asia-Pacific - 
or more specifically, East Asia - is anything but an illustration of cooperative behaviour 
in pursuit of positive sum games. On the contrary, as the testimony of US Trade 
Representative Charlane Barshefsky graphically revealed, the IMF reform packages for 
East Asia will ‘complement and reinforce our trade policy goals’ (cited in Bullard et al 
1998: 123).  
 
Not only does the US retain veto power and major influence over the IMF’s overall 
policy direction (Rapkin et al 1997), but the ‘rescue packages’ being implemented in the 
troubled economies in East Asia contain such specific requirements of recipients so as 
to fundamentally restructure their domestic political economies. Whatever the 
‘technical’ merits of the IMF packages, there is clearly no doubt that – if fully 
implemented – they would transform the structure of economies which the US has been 
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unsuccessfully attempting to reform for a number of years. In other words, in the current 
environment in which the East Asian region finds itself in a highly vulnerable position, 
attempts to reconfigure domestic political and economic systems  seem to owe more to 
the power-centred perspective of Samuel Huntington (1993) than they do to Keohane’s 
cooperative and enlightened institution building schema  considered earlier. 
 
Although the principle interest here is not in dissecting the possible merits of  IMF 
policies, it is necessary to make a few brief comments about the detail of the reforms it 
has developed for the region as they have been subjected to a number of cogent and 
revealing criticisms. 11 The most important point to highlight is what the IMF (1998:2) 
itself calls the  ‘far-reaching structural reforms at the heart of all the programs’. In 
Indonesia, for example, the IMF has insisted on a detailed range of changes to the 
banking sector (including wholesale closures),  privatisation programs, the abolition of 
monopolies and a range of measures that effectively break open existing centres of 
economic power and control (Jakarta Post, January 17, 1998: 5). Again, it is not 
necessary to establish whether or not these are useful measures on technical efficiency 
grounds, to recognise that they are profoundly threatening to the existing order and go 
much further than any measures undertaken in other comparable crises.12 Similarly, the 
reforms being demanded of South Korea are sufficiently comprehensive and demanding 
as to effectively spell the end of the Korean high-debt model  of economic expansion 
(Ministry of Finance and Economy, 1997).13 
 
Two key points emerge from this overview of the IMF’s recent activities. First, the IMF 
approach not only stands in stark contrast to that of APEC, but it is an effective 
refutation of the logic that underpins much influential, predominantly North American 
scholarship. Clearly, the IMF’s systematic attempts to dismantle the central structures of 
East Asian capitalism and impose a ‘level playing field’ in the region have little to do 
with the enlightened, cooperative pursuit of reducing transaction costs, and everything 
to do with the application of economic and political leverage in a post-Cold War 
environment in which the US can privilege domestic interests unconstrained by strategic 
considerations (Ruggie 1996).  
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Second, it is not necessary to defend authoritarian rule or ‘crony capitalism’ to 
acknowledge that the currently parlous condition of countries like Indonesia has as 
much to do with the activities of highly mobile financial capital and a reconfigured 
international political economy as it does with any strictly domestic issues (Beeson 
1998). When even orthodox economists have criticised the IMF’s approach and drawn 
attention to an IMF-Wall Street–Treasury complex that appears to favour the interests of 
rentier capitalists in the US despite the potential damage further financial liberalisation 
may cause to East Asian economies (Bhagwati 1998), then the preconditions for 
entrenching what Richard Higgott (1998) calls the ‘politics of resentment’ are clearly in 






The roles played by  APEC and the IMF in the wake of the crisis could hardly be more 
different. When confronted by its first major test, APEC has been revealed to be 
ineffectual at best and completely irrelevant at worst. The IMF, by contrast, has played 
a prominent and at times decisive role in influencing the trajectory of the crisis itself and 
in reshaping regional institutions in its aftermath. This is not meant to imply that the 
IMF’s policy prescriptions were in some way ‘correct’ or appropriate in a way that 
APEC’s were not, however. On the contrary, there is every reason to think that the 
IMF’s insistence on fiscal austerity and increased liberalisation may actually have 
exacerbated an already perilous economic position. The point to emphasise is that the 
IMF did not need to rely on moral suasion or achieve consensus about the direction and 
content of regional public policy  to achieve its aims. In short, the IMF’s application of 
direct political and economic leverage has proved a far more efficacious route to 
regional institutional reform than has APEC’s voluntarist approach. 
 
Although most attention has understandably focused on the unfolding dynamics of crisis 
management, the crisis has also highlighted a number of important theoretical issues. 
APEC’s conspicuous absence and inability to play a meaningful role during the crisis 
suggests that the sorts of theoretical assumptions that informed its policy style and 
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rationale are incapable of either explaining the crisis itself or of providing a useful 
template for future policy. It is important to recognise that the institutional change that 
is occurring in East Asia is not the triumph of good policy over bad, or ill-informed 
Asians finally recognising the error of their ways and rationally opting for a technically 
optimal, neo-liberal economic paradigm. While there may be ‘technocrats’ sympathetic 
to Anglo-American forms of  economic organisation throughout the region, the 
principal engine of change is a combination of external pressure and a diminishing 
capacity for domestic resistance. The IMF’s policies are significant in this regard as 
they implicitly recognise the importance of embedded institutions as a potential 
obstacles to change in the region. This is not to suggest that IMF or Treasury 
Department officials have been diligently reading a variant of institutional theory that 
takes historical specificity seriously and acting upon its insights, but to suggest that 
some variants of institutional theory offer much more plausible readings of institutional 
change in the region than others. 
 
Historically grounded institutional theory reminds us that the current struggle to shape 
the institutional infrastructure that will constrain and determine the course of the 
region’s evolution will inevitably  be a political one that reflects the relative strengths of 
key actors within the region, rather than being an expression of inherent rationality or 
simply the desire to reduce transaction costs. Consequently, we may find that not only 
will the efforts of the IMF to impose a neoliberal reform agenda on the region be 
resisted, but that the practical and theoretical challenges thrown up by the crisis will 
force a similar reassessment of neoliberal reform itself. As the international economic 
system teeters on the brink of recession if not depression, there are grounds for 
supposing that the current difficulties facing the region may be as much to do with 
capitalism in general, rather than its East Asian manifestations in particular. In such 
circumstances, a revaluation of the structure of Anglo-American economic institutions 
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1 For a more extensive discussion of the differences between rational choice, historical and 
sociological forms of institutionalism, see, (Hall and Taylor 1996).  
2 Mayhew (1987) makes the point that even if it is accepted that definitions of ‘rationality’ are 
universally applicable, what are taken to be rational institutions may vary considerably across 
nations. This is, as we shall see, a potentially serious obstacle for APEC. 
3 As North (1990b)  points out, in circumstances where criminal activity guarantees the greatest 
pay off, then organisational development will reflect such incentives, a suggestion  that  the 
contemporary experience of Russia seems to support. 
4 Even the concept of ‘bounded rationality’ fails to satisfactorily deal  with the limited 
applicability this notion , particularly the dubious assumptions about human motivation and 
access to information that the idea of rationality entails. For a fuller discussion of these 
limitations, see, Lane (1991 chapter 3). 
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5 APEC’s current membership is: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, the Unites States and Taiwan, or ‘Chinese Taipei’ as it is 
known in APEC-speak given Mainland sensitivities about Taiwan’s status. Russia, Vietnam, 
and Peru will join in 1998. Comprehensive profiles of the APEC membership’s very different 
economies are available at http://www.apecsec.org.sg/member/apecmemb.html. 
6 Revealingly, in Bob Hawke’s initial proposal the US was not included, reflecting the primacy 
of the East Asia region in Australian thinking. Such a grouping would have been of less use to 
Japan, however, as it would have been less effective in tying the US to the region strategically, 
nor would it have provided a vital mechanism with which to mange the problematic trade 
relations with the US and keep open  US markets. See Higgott et al  (1990). 
7 For brief biographies of the EPG members, see the Eminent Persons Group (1993:71-5). 
8 A recent survey of APEC members found that an  ‘extraordinary variety’ of tariff and non-
tariff barriers remain in place, often at levels of 200 per cent or more in sensitive high value-
added industries like car production (CEDA 1995).  
9 For a detailed overview of APEC’s proposed reform agenda, see APEC Secretariat (1995). 
Some of the more salient points that might be briefly mentioned here which are likely to impact 
on national political-economies and existent  distributional coalitions are: a desire to promote 
‘transparency’ with regard to legal and regulatory processes; the pursuit of non-discrimination 
in trade and investment outcomes; the encouragement of competition policies as a central 
organising mechanism within APEC economies.  
10 For overviews of the postwar international economic system’s development see Gilpin (1987) 
and Block (1977). 
11 There are by now a number of cogent critiques of the IMF approach which centre on the 
inappropriateness of fiscal austerity for countries experiencing a crisis of private sector debt; the 
favouring of external lenders over domestic reconstruction; the IMF’s own lack of transparency; 
the IMF’s role in exacerbating the ‘moral hazard’ problem. See Radelet and Sachs (1998). 
12 Indeed, it is instructive to compare the way the IMF has treated nuclear-armed Russia which 
has been able to flout IMF demands with relative impunity. (See The Economist July 11, 1998). 
13 Detailed statements of the proposed changes to the financial sectors of Thailand and 
Indonesia are available through the IMF’s homepage. For a detailed critique of the IMF’s 
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